DIAMOND MINING
IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE:
PROGRAMMING OPTIONS FOR
THE ARTISANAL SECTOR

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About DDI International

DDII is an international, nonprofit, charitable organization that aims to gather all interested parties into a process that will address, in a comprehensive way, the political, social and economic challenges facing the artisanal diamond mining sector, in order to optimize the beneficial development impact of artisanal mining to miners and their communities within the countries in which the diamonds are mined.

A major objective is to draw development organizations and more developmentally sound investment into artisanal diamond mining areas, to find ways to make development programming more effective, and to help bring the informational diamond mining sector into the formal economy.

More information on DDI International can be found at www.ddiglobal.org, and we can be reached at enquiries@ddiglobal.org.

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Cover Photo: Children in Bobi, Côte d’Ivoire, check to see if there are diamonds left in a small pile of washed gravel (Terah U. DeJong)

ARTISANAL DIAMOND MINING IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE: PROGRAMMING OPTIONS FOR THE SECTOR

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Foreword

Since 2004, the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire has been under a sanctions regime imposed by the UN Security Council, after a civil war in 2002 split the country into a rebel-held North and a Government-controlled South. The sanctions regime was enlarged in 2005 to include a ban on the export of rough diamonds.

In the past two years, to integrate the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), Côte d’Ivoire has focused on meeting the minimum compliance requirements and received significant assistance in that regard. There is high anticipation that Côte d’Ivoire may integrate the Kimberley Process and that with the integration, the ban on exporting diamonds and perhaps the overall sanctions regime may be lifted in April 2014.

The anticipation has lead to several assistance programs for the artisanal diamond mining sector in Côte d’Ivoire. The Diamond Development Initiative (DDI) has a keen interest in offering its expertise to the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire. Particularly, we believe that as a new entrant, with a new system put in place, the country has an opportunity to be efficient in the KP implementation, by integrating development alongside regulation. To inform and guide our work and that of other interested parties, we contracted a consultancy to assess the programming opportunities in Côte d’Ivoire.
Acronyms

ASDM  Artisanal and Small-Scale Diamond Mining
ASM  Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining
CFA  Currency in Côte d’Ivoire (Communauté Financière Africaine franc)
DD  Local mining department (Direction départementale)
DDI  Diamond Development Initiative
DGD  Customs Directorate (Direction Générale des Douanes)
DGMG  General Mining Directorate (Direction Générale des Mines et de la Géologie)
EITI  Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
EU  European Union
FOCDI  Friends of Côte d’Ivoire
GVC  Groupements à Vocation Coopérative (village-based mining cooperative)
LSM  Large-scale mining
KP  Kimberley Process
KPCS  Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
MEF  Ministry of Economy and Finances
MIM  Ministry of Industry and Mines
MMPE  Ministry of Mines, Petroleum and Energy
PRADD  Property Rights and Artisanal Diamond Development
SEEPMP  Precious stones evaluation service (Service d’Expertise et d’Evaluation des Pierres et Métaux Précieux)
SODEMI  State Society for Development of the Mining Industry (Société pour le Développement Minier de la Côte d’Ivoire)
SPRPK-CI  KP Permanent Secretariat (Secrétariat Permanent de la Représentation du Processus de Kimberley en Côte d’Ivoire)

UN  United Nations
UN GoE  United Nations Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire
UNOCI  United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
USGS  United States Geological Survey
WDDF  Washington Declaration Diagnostic Framework
WGAAP  Working Group of Artisanal and Alluvial Production (Kimberley Process)
WGM  Working Group on Monitoring (Kimberley Process)
Introduction

This consultancy report presents the results from a research study carried out in Côte d’Ivoire in August 2013 for the Diamond Development Initiative (DDI). The study aimed at answering the following questions:

1. What is the socioeconomic and political context of ASDM in Côte d’Ivoire and what is the community development situation in relevant communities?
2. What are the key challenges and opportunities in the sector?
3. What kinds of interventions would best improve the lives and livelihoods of artisanal miners?
4. Which interventions do the miners consider to be priorities and which are priorities for the government?
5. What interventions are currently being undertaken (objectives, by whom, duration and timelines, total cost if possible) and which ones are planned?

As per the study’s terms of reference, the research employed a mixed-methods approach. The consultant conducted stakeholder interviews and logistical planning in Abidjan from August 2—10, followed by field research in the two diamond-producing regions of the country (Seguela and Tortiya) from August 11—24, and completed data analysis and final interviews from August 24—30.

This consultancy report will first present in detail the study’s research methodology, including a discussion of limitations and problems encountered.

Second, the report will offer an in-depth analysis of the sociopolitical and socioeconomic context of ASDM. This will include:

» Overview and history of diamond mining in Côte d’Ivoire.

» Analysis of key institutional and policy issues relevant to potential programming.

» Presentation and analysis of the socioeconomic context in mining communities based on qualitative and quantitative data from the study.

Finally, the report will offer an analysis of programming options, organized as follows:

» Presentation of existing and planned interventions.

» Presentation of community priorities based on survey results.

» Detailed analysis framed by the Washington Declaration Diagnostic Framework (WDDF). This section will include, for each of the 11 policy action areas, a SWOT analysis (Strength-Weakness-Opportunity-Threat), summary of community and government priorities, and consultant recommendations.
Study Methodology

In order to answer the five research questions, a mixed-methods approach combined the following tools:

1. **Semi-structured interviews.** The consultant conducted semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders in Abidjan, Séguela and Tortiya. These interviews were essential in identifying government priorities (as expressed by authorities), community priorities (as expressed by observers, leaders or key informants), as well as for gathering information on existing interventions. A list of people met can be found Annex 1.

   During the interviews, the consultant began with open-ended questions so as not to bias responses. However, follow-up and probing questions were based on an interview checklist. This checklist contained a list of possible interventions as identified in the Washington Declaration Diagnostic Framework (WDDF).

   The consultant therefore used the WDDF to frame his questioning. Sometimes the questions were open-ended, such as, “How would you recommend improving formalization through fiscal incentives?” (WDDF Policy Action A1). Other questions were narrower and focused on specific best practices highlighted in the WDDF. For example: “Do you think that helping mining cooperatives finance activities of their members would work in Côte d’Ivoire?” (WDDF Policy Action B2).

2. **Participatory methods.** The consultant spent three days in the village of Bobi and used participatory methods to gain a holistic understanding of ASDM and its context. It is important to note that while the tools were inspired by Rapid Rural Appraisal (RRA) and Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) methodology, this was not an RRA or PRA. Among the reasons were insufficient time and lack of an interdisciplinary research team. In addition, a full RRA report was not prepared. Rather, information from the participatory tools informed the quantitative survey and subsequent focus groups. The idea was to go beyond a rapid meeting with the village elite, as is often what happens when time is limited.

   Participatory methods employed included:

   - **Transect walk,** to gain a rapid overview of infrastructure, social organization and other realities.
   - **Wealth ranking exercise,** to gain an understanding of economic groups and their change through time.
   - **Economic activity matrix,** to gain an understanding of all economic activities of men and women to contextualize ASDM in a broader rural livelihoods framework.
   - **Historical matrix,** to gain an understanding of how key variables related to mining and socioeconomic well-being change through time.

   The consultant hired a translator from Bobi for these sessions, who also assisted in choosing participants that included a cross-section of villagers, including men and women, migrants and indigenous members, miners and non-miners, young and old, etc.

   Bobi was chosen because it is currently the most active diamond mining village in Côte d’Ivoire, and because previously established relationships with village elders helped ease access.

   Results from these exercises will not be presented separately, but rather integrated into the overall consultancy report’s conclusions, as appropriate.

3. **Focus Groups.** Following the exercises in Bobi, the consultant then sought to visit as many villages as possible. One day was first necessary to visit all villages, inform them of the study’s objectives, and schedule a date and time for the focus group meeting. In all, focus groups were conducted in 10 of the 22 diamond mining villages in the Séguela region. The choice of villages was done in collaboration with agents from the local mining office to that the sample was representative of different levels of activity, population, strength of organization, demographics and other factors.

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1 The WDDF has not yet been adopted by the Kimberley Process as an official methodology. In June 2013, a USAID-funded workshop at the KP Intercessional sought input from KP participants. An updated version was distributed to participants for their comments before September 15, 2013. The final document will be presented at the KP Plenary in November. This study used the draft distributed on July 15, 2013 by the KP Administrative Support Mechanism central focal point.

2 WDDF June 2013 Draft, p. 5-6.

3 Bobi, Sangana, Diarabana, Dualla, Dona, Sokoura, Mamourla, Siana, Niongonon, Masala-Asolo
The questions in these focus groups were conducted in a similar manner to the semi-structured interviews, as described above. In early focus groups, the consultant followed customary protocol in which a person from that village provides the translation. However, due to issues with the quality of this translation, the consultant extended the contract with the translator from Bobi, who was already familiar with the study’s objectives.

4. **Site Visits.** As a part of the visits to each village, the consultant sought to visit, whenever possible, active or former diamond mining areas. This allowed the consultant to view a variety of sites, including colluvial, alluvial, and kimberlitic. In addition, degraded former mining sites were also visited.

5. **Quantitative Survey.** Finally, the research study included a quantitative survey of 100 miners in the Séguéla region. The sampling frame was derived as follows: First, the consultant gained access to the list of 884 mining workers recently registered by the government as part of its efforts to become Kimberley Process compliant. A random sample was then drawn using Excel’s built-in randomizing algorithm. A list of 100 names and 50 back-up names was then constituted. Three villages (Bobi, Diarabana, and Dualla) accounted for over 90% of the list due to their population sizes and their level of activity.

The survey-taker worked with local mining cooperative leaders to locate those on the list. If a particular person was not available, a replacement was then found from the back-up list. This process was logistically challenging, as many who were not on the list wanted to participate, and some were suspicious about how the list was derived. However, taking miners on a first-come, first-served basis would have biased the results towards older miners and non-migrant miners. As such, great effort was taken to stick to the list, including calling names from the mosque loudspeaker.

Unfortunately, it was not possible to fully follow the list in the village of Diarabana, due to a lower level of support and cooperation from village authorities. Once all possible people on the list and back-up list were found, the survey-taker divided the village into 4 blocks and took an equal number of registered miners from each block on a first-come, first-served basis. It was market day, so miners were not working, and this solution should limit the risk of sampling bias.

Besides this limitation, however, it should be noted that the survey population—the 884 miners on the list—is not necessarily fully representative of miners in the region. The main reason is that this list contains only those miners who were recently registered, meaning that miners who were less motivated to follow the government’s instructions were not sampled. However, despite these issues, the consultant believes that the 100 respondents were reasonably representative. That said, the results from the survey should not be used for rigorous impact evaluations due to the above limitations.

The survey questionnaire (see Annex 3) was developed by the consultant in collaboration with local SODEMI and Mining Ministry agents, the translator and research assistant. The research assistant was found in Abidjan based on familiarity with these community development issues and ability to communicate in the local dialect. No additional survey takers were hired, in part as to limit the possibility of questioning inconsistency.

Questions covered three main areas: socioeconomic information, mining practice information, and information on preferred interventions. The questions were tested beforehand with the translator, and the survey-taker noted translations of all key questions in writing so as to ensure uniformity. Following the completion of the survey, results were coded into an Excel spreadsheet and imported into Stata for analysis. Only descriptive statistics were compiled, and these results are presented below.

It should be noted that the approach used for Tortiya was slightly different. Because mining is not organized by village-based cooperatives, semi-structured interviews and site visits were conducted instead of focus groups. In one case, miners fled when approached, but most were eventually open to questioning. The only focus group held was with a group representing diamond collectors and a separate group representing all those who held ASDM authorizations before the war.

In these ways, the consultant employed a mixed quantitative and qualitative research approach.
Sociopolitical and Socioeconomic Context

Overview of Ivoirian Diamond Mining

Diamond mining in Côte d’Ivoire occurs in two areas centered on the towns of Séguéla (region of Worodougou) and Tortiya (region of Vallée du Bandama). Both regions are located in the northern part of the country (see Figure 3). Diamonds were first discovered in Côte d’Ivoire in 1928, but exploitation only began in the 1940s by the French company SAREMCI (Société Anonyme de Recherche et d’Exploitation Minières en Côte d’Ivoire). The activities focused on the region of Tortiya, and continued through the 1960s, eventually winding down in 1975 when further exploitation was economically unviable. At its height, SAREMCI produced 150,000 to 175,000 carats per year. Most of the inhabitants of the town of Tortiya are either former workers or descendants of former workers for SAREMCI. This is an important fact for understanding the land tenure situation in Tortiya, which is significantly different from the Séguéla region.

In and around Séguéla, mining began five years prior to Côte d’Ivoire’s independence in 1960. Key actors included the French SANDRAMINE (Compagnie Minière du Haut-Sassandra) who ceded their exploration permits to SODIAMCI (Société Diamantifère de la Côte d’Ivoire) whose production peaked at 25,000 carats in 1965. In addition, SODEMI (Société pour le Développement Minier en Côte d’Ivoire) partnered with an American-backed company Waston in the early 1960s, and used industrial and semi-industrial methods until 1977. In the late 1990s, SODEMI launched a joint venture with an Australian-backed firm (African Carnegie Diamonds Plc.), and several kimberlitic deposits were explored, but never exploited due to the civil war that began in 2002 (see below).

Artisanal diamond activity has dominated Ivoirian production, especially since the 1970s. Following independence, ASDM was legalized by the new government, and this led to an influx of miners, especially in the Séguéla region. In response to this “rush” situation, the government reversed its position and outlawed all ASDM in 1962. Villagers around Séguéla still remember this period as one of fear and
violence, with a villager in Bobi describing it as an endless “manhunt.”

4 ASDM did not stop, however, but continued in a disorderly and illicit manner. In 1984, the government reversed course again and legalized ASM, continued in a disorderly and illicit manner.

In 1986, the government charged SODEMI with the task of organizing miners into village-based cooperatives called GVCs (groupements à vocation coopérative).

5 SODEMI proceeded to map and delimit zones inside of their diamond research permits in which ASDM was permitted. Agreements were signed with the 22 GVCs who joined the scheme that set forth conditions, including a ban on mining kimberlitic deposits. This was enforced by joint patrols by SODEMI agents, who established a research camp near Bobi, and military police. Anyone found without SODEMI-issued mining worker cards, which indicated which GVC they belonged to, or anyone working outside of the delimited area, was subject to prosecution. Over the 16 years in which this arrangement existed, nearly 100 zones were delimited and exploited.

Perhaps the most innovative feature of the system was the sales organization. As per their agreements with SODEMI, GVCs were required to coordinate and control all diamond sales. Guards would monitor all diamond washing and take possession of any stones discovered. The GVC would then organize regular events in which the lead mining worker would negotiate with his financial backer. The final sales figure would be recorded by the GVC, which would then take 20 percent. Of this 20 percent, 12 went to the GVCs, and 8 went to SODEMI. Of this 8 percent, 4 percent was used to pay the guards, and the rest was collected on behalf of the state.

GVCs have been interpreted “pre-cooperatives” but in reality they were more of a cross between a land management and a local development committee. Few characteristics of a cooperative were present: there was never profit-sharing, never financing activities of members, never pooling resources, never selling collectively and never material or financial support provided to members. In addition, membership was not based on profession but based on being an indigenous member of the village. In other words, “outsiders” from Mali, Guinea, Niger or other countries – which sometimes constituted 60% of a village’s population – required a local tuteur who was entitled to a portion of sales revenue, after the GVC took its cut. In these ways, the GVCs were not cooperatives or even pre-cooperatives but structures that used customary land authority to control diamond production. By most accounts this system was much more effective than state-led law enforcement alone, since collective financial and cultural interests created social pressure that kept everyone in check.

In addition to this role of “land management committee,” however, the GVCs acted as a village development committee. Using its resources, the GVCs funded village development efforts. Construction projects included mosques, schools, cultural centers, health facilities, bridges and even roads. In addition, the GVC funds were used as a kind of insurance fund for villagers in need. For example, a villager with a family health issue could take out a loan, which he would repay without interest. This dual role of the GVCs is important to understand when their potential is evaluated for launching direct marketing schemes (WDDF Policy Action A5) and working capital and organization (WDDF Policy Action B2).

In Tortiya, the state took a different but no less progressive policy towards ASDM. All diamond-producing areas were sub-divided into 100-hectare square lots, and these could then be licensed for artisanal or semi-industrial production. In 1995, the new mining code formalized this possibility by introducing the “artisanal and semi-industrial production” authorization, which was distinct from industrial research or exploitation permits. Accurate maps were developed for this system, and numbers attributed to each of the approximately 500 lots. The amount of permits never reached this number, however, because most of the plots were not profitable. In addition, the ASDM authorization was still relatively cumbersome to acquire, as it required signature from the mining minister. The total number of valid authorizations immediately prior to the civil was 19.7

The crisis that began in 2002 dramatically changed the situation. The instability began in the previous decade, and has its roots in post-independence agricultural and land policy, but 2002 marked the beginning of the crise because that was the year when the country was divided into two. After a failed coup attempt, rebel forces called the Forces nouvelles seized control of the north, where both diamond zones were located. SODEMI and the mining administration left shortly thereafter. Following the 2007 Ouagadougou Political Agreement, the mining administration began to redeploy, with departmental mining directors (DD) returning to both Tortiya and Séguéla in 2008. However, until reunification of the country was achieved in 2011, the administration had no control.


5 The GVC was a legally recognized form of organization in Côte d’Ivoire that was not just valid in the mining sector, but for any legal economic activity. The legal form of GVC existed until 1997, when a law on cooperatives gave a two-year window to convert into cooperatives. None of the GVCs in Séguéla did so.


7 Source: DD Mines Tortiya.
**Force nouvelle** zone and sector commanders formed parallel structures. In some cases, control of diamond mines by armed elements was direct, such as a large site in Tortiya referred to as the BCEO, because it brought money like West Africa’s regional bank. Near Séguela, the Bobi dyke was similarly exploited in the presence of armed elements, with kimberlitic rocks being crushed with pieces of wood. However, in other cases the **Forces Nouvelles** was became a parallel administration. In Bobi, for example, the **Forces nouvelles** occupied SODEMI’s camp, allowed artisanal diamond mining to continue, and collected the 20 percent tax taken by the GVC. In other villages, such as Ousougoula, abuse and violence against miners resulted in a village-wide decision to indefinitely stop diamond mining.

What many miners remember from that period, however, is not the presence of rebel forces but the departure of all buying houses and their affiliated collectors. These buying houses were the lifeblood of ASDM production, as is typical in many producing countries, due to their role as the source of all financing. Most buying houses began leaving around the same time as SODEMI, as the government in Abidjan banned all diamond sales licenses by presidential decree. The departure became definitive several years later when the United Nations Security Council imposed an embargo on Ivoirian diamonds through Resolution 1643. Through subsequent years, the Group of Experts charged with monitoring the embargo found evidence that Ivoirian diamonds continued to infiltrate international markets via neighboring countries. The embargo was most recently extended through April 2014, though Article 6 of Resolution 2101 states that the Security Council is prepared to revisit the measures in light of progress towards Kimberley Process compliance.

Indeed, Côte d’Ivoire has never been declared compliant with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), which entered into effect in 2003. The government had participated in all aspects of the creation of the scheme, and had gone so far as to print its KP certificate and pass a law in 2003 modifying the 1995 mining code so as to become compliant with the minimum requirements. However, due to the government’s lack of control over mining areas, Côte d’Ivoire has been unable to export to other KPCS participants. In response to and in support of the U.N. embargo, the KP also took measures to prevent Ivoirian diamonds from entering the legal market through the 2005 Moscow Declaration and the 2007 Brussels Initiative.

The result of the embargo was felt particularly strongly by mining communities in Séguela. While production continued, the income that reached diggers fell dramatically. According to the Bobi GVC sales records, which showed consistent and ongoing production during the crisis, average price per carat fell from 62,000 FCFA (US$124) in 2001 to 8,400 FCFA (US$16.80) per carat in 2007, the last year for which data is available. In the meantime, overall production nationwide continued. A 2013 study by the U.S. Geological Survey estimated that annual production between 2006 and 2011 varied between 91,048 carats and 288,138 carats nationwide.

Following the post-electoral violence and its resolution with the arrest of the outgoing president in April 2011, production appears to have dipped. The same USGS study estimated that production in 2012 was 173,388 carats, or about 100,000 carats less than in the prior two years. The latest U.N. Group of Experts report estimated 2012 production as between 50,000 and 100,000 carats. Several factors could account for the decrease, including the depletion of financing and the end of rebel-led production. In addition, many diamond miners—especially migrants from other countries in the region—switched to gold mining, which since the end of the crisis has taken on “rush” proportions in sections of the country, including areas near Séguela. As a result, whereas Tortiya once supported 40,000 miners, and Séguela some 30,000 miners, recent government estimates point to 1,000 to 2,000 miners in Tortiya and 5,000 to 10,000 miners in Séguela.

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8. S/RES/2013/2101


11. S/RES/2013/228, p. 37


The recent registration drive of miners in Séguéla points to even lower figures, mainly 997 workers, many of whom are not active, as revealed in the quantitative survey for this study.\textsuperscript{14} This will almost certainly change when the embargo lifts and financing starts flowing again, but the long-term prospects are uncertain. One unknown is the geological potential. As noted later in this report, villagers have asked for help in finding new deposits, because most of the proven productive areas have been mined out. The USGS estimates that there are some 11,100,000 carats that remain,\textsuperscript{15} which is not insignificant, but is also not a very large figure in the context of historical production. Only further research will reveal the extent to which ASDM is poised to become a major activity. What is sure is that once the embargo lifts, and financing returns, activity will likely ramp up to eventually reach typical levels of around 300,000 carats per year.

**Political, Policy, and Institutional Factors**

Efforts by the government to become compliant with the KPCS and get the embargo lifted form an important backdrop for understanding the context for ASDM in Côte d’Ivoire today. As noted above, Côte d’Ivoire has been a participant in the KPCS since its beginning in 2003, but has never become compliant due to the crisis and the U.N. embargo. With the end of the civil war in 2011, the new government has continually made its case that the UN sanctions are no longer justified. However, the UN Group of Experts has called into question the government’s ability to control diamond mining zones, among other concerns, and has made compliance with the KPCS a key criterion that would demonstrate that sanctions are no longer needed.

In 2010, a group of countries created the Friends of Côte d’Ivoire (FOCDI) to help the Ivorian government move towards KPCS compliance and the lifting of the embargo. The FOCDI group includes the United States, the European Union, Canada, Belgium, United Kingdom, Brazil, Ghana, and the Republic of South Africa. In August 2012, ambassadors representing the FOCDI countries visited diamond-producing areas and offered advice to the Ivorian authorities on how to achieve these requirements, and FOCDI representatives deployed a field mission in September 2012. During both visits, the KP Permanent Secretary requested technical assistance, and an adviser was deployed in March 2013, funded first by USAID, and from August by the EU.

Key activities supported by the adviser include the adoption of comprehensive KP compliance procedures from mine to export (see Figure 6 for an overview), adoption of appropriate regulatory changes, and a field launch of the registration and sales tracking system up until the point of first sale. As a result of the progress, the KP Working Group on Monitoring agreed at the June 2013 Intercessional to send an official review visit, which will conduct its work from September 30 to October 4. While it is impossible to predict, it would appear as if there is now significant momentum towards KP compliance by the end of 2013. Once KP compliance is achieved, the lifting of the U.N. embargo should follow, given Article 6 of Resolution 2101, although the work...
of the U.N. Group of Experts is a disparate institution channel, so this is not a given.\textsuperscript{17}

The possibility of the embargo lifting in the next 6-8 months is crucial in the context of planning support programs. Frustration over the sanctions in the Ivoirian government—and especially in mining communities—has been steadily mounting since the end of the crisis, and this has translated into a remarkable amount of political will and momentum in doing whatever it takes to become KPCS-compliant.\textsuperscript{18} Any intervention will therefore have the opportunity to capitalize on this momentum, even after the embargo is lifted. Whereas in other ASDM countries building understanding and buy-in for work can take months and years, this will not be the case in Côte d’Ivoire, at least in a general sense. The flip side, of course, is the danger of unrealistic expectations, but this does not change the fact that the ideal time for support programs is now.

Besides the embargo and KPCS compliance, the following political, policy and institutional factors will play an important role in shaping any interventions in the coming months and years:

1. Mining Code Revision

The 1995 mining code has been under revision for over a year. While the government has set its sights on the end of 2013 as the absolute deadline to pass the new law, and has taken bold steps to do so,\textsuperscript{19} previous delays should give observers caution. The primary impetus behind the revision is an attempt to create an attractive regulatory framework for industrial actors interested in developing Côte d’Ivoire’s rich but underexploited mineral resources.

As mentioned earlier, the code gives a legal space for ASM, which it defines as “any operation for which activities consist of extracting and collecting mineral substances and recovering marketable products using manual and traditional methods and techniques.”\textsuperscript{20} In order to legally practice ASM, one must have an artisanal and semi-industrial authorization, which unlike an industrial exploration or exploitation permit is signed by the mining minister rather than the president. Figure 7 provides some key facts on the authorization process.

In the context of the mining code revision process, the overall licensing framework will unlikely change. It has been proposed to change the license title to “artisanal and small-scale authorization” instead of semi-industrial, since defining semi-industrial is not easy, though “small-scale” is not easy either. In addition, relevant KP procedures related to mining worker registration requirements and commercial traceability for diamonds have been added in to implement the schema in Figure 6.

The most significant proposed change, however, concerns the possibility of “indirect” licensing through allowing industrial actors to sign agreements with organized groups of ASM actors working on their concessions. This would in effect provide a legal basis for the “SODEMI Model.” It should be noted that strictly speaking, SODEMI’s allowing GVCs to operate in limited areas of its exploration permit without giving up any mineral rights was not in line with the 1995 code, since no ASM authorizations were delivered, nor could they be since two permits (industrial and artisanal) cannot overlap. Provisions in the new code would allow such arrangements, provided that organized miners are subject to the same registration and chain of custody requirements. If included in the final version of the law, this would mark a significant policy shift and an unusual (and potentially innovative) tool to promote effective ASM governance and ASM/LSM cohabitation.

| Validity | 2 years, renewable in 2 year increments |
| Size | 25 and 100 hectares |
| Fees | 20,000 FCFA (US$40) plus 3,000 FCFA per hectare (US$6). Fees higher for renewal. |
| Authorized Holder | Individual, Company or Cooperative |
| Required Nationality | Ivoirian |

\textsuperscript{17} The recent change of the U.N. diamond expert has driven this point home, since by many accounts, he places more importance on stamping out current illicit sales rather than KP compliance.

\textsuperscript{18} This pressure took some time to mount, and did not really begin to manifest in a strong way until early 2013, as the President became frustrated with ministers not moving fast enough. Because his platform of economic reconstruction depended on rebuilding Côte d’Ivoire’s image as a business-friendly destination for foreign direct investment, lifting the diamond embargo—though not linked to a large part of the Ivoirian economy—was important. The recent integration of Côte d’Ivoire into the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in May 2013 also demonstrates this government concern with improving its image through complying with international norms.

\textsuperscript{19} Some insiders suspect that the recent ministry shuffle whereby the mining portfolio was given to the Ministry of Industry was due in part to frustration from the top on the nature and length of the process. As of this writing, the new minister is accelerating the process, and is involving the World Bank in getting stakeholder input into the draft by the end of September.

\textsuperscript{20} Article 1, translated from the French by consultant.
2. SODEMI Model Implementation

As part of efforts towards KP compliance, the SODEMI model described above is being revitalized and adapted to the emerging KP system of internal controls. In May, the president signed three decrees granting diamond exploration permits to SODEMI covering roughly the same area of its exploration permits pre-2002. Following this, the mining minister signed a decree authorizing and mandating SODEMI to organize ASDM miners inside its permit areas.

Unlike in the past, miners must be organized in cooperative enterprises instead of GVCs. The main reason is that GVCs no longer exist under Ivoirian law. Instead, the country is promoting the cooperative enterprise framework as defined in an OHADA law common to a number of countries in West Africa. Efforts are currently underway to assist GVCs complete this legal transition. In addition, the KP Secretariat has approved a new agreement to be signed between SODEMI and the cooperative enterprises which stipulates that all KP procedures must be followed.21

In the short term, the goal is simply to revitalize the successful SODEMI scheme while adapting it to new regulatory realities. In the medium and long-term, however, there are a number of opportunities that could present themselves. For example, partners could assist the cooperative enterprises go beyond their roles as land management and village development committees and actually become functioning cooperatives. A number of these ideas will be explored further in this report, but the institutional and policy context stemming from the SODEMI model deserves special mention.

One potential complication from this context is that an outside partner interested in working with the former GVCs near Séguela must negotiate with SODEMI, since they are the legal permit holder and the authorized “organizers” of the ASDM in their permit. SODEMI may or may not be interested in an outside actor assisting their work.22 Because SODEMI is a state enterprise, however, they will adapt to government directives. In other words, potential actors should be sensitive to SODEMI’s interests, and should pursue productive partnerships with SODEMI, while all the while remembering that the Mining Ministry has the ultimate say.

Finally, one should not expect that SODEMI will stick to the old GVC system. SODEMI has indicated its interest in launching a diamond buying house. The government has made it clear that such a buying house cannot enter into exclusive agreements with the cooperatives in order to avoid the negative effects of monopoly. However, this could have a complicating effect on any programs aimed at direct marketing. In addition, SODEMI plans on re-launching its research programs to assess potential industrial-grade diamond deposits. If a discovery is made, and SODEMI finds an international partner, the key ASDM issues will change from how to organize miners to how to prevent conflicts and ensure that mining communities benefit from industrial development.

3. Mining Ministry Institutional Dynamics

In July the Ministry of Mining, Petroleum and Energy became the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy. The Ministry of Industry, up until this point a relatively small ministry, was renamed the Ministry of Industry and Mines. The ripple effects of this shift are still being felt. One key uncertainty is the extent to which the old mining administration will migrate to the new ministry. There are indications that the new ministry aims at making a clean break with the past, and for the last two months, the existing mining administration has been in limbo. A related uncertainty is whether the position of KP Permanent Secretary will still be held by the Deputy Cabinet Director, as it is now. The current arrangement has given the KP Permanent Secretary clout and decision-making power that has helped implement and advance KP compliance. A continuation of this arrangement would help future partners interested in supporting the KP.

It is of course too early to tell what the upcoming reorganization or reform will look like, or how it will affect any future programming in the ASDM sector. One worrying possibility, however, is that Côte d’Ivoire’s history of progressive ASM policy will be undermined under the new leadership, which may be biased towards industrial development and move towards a more

21 Under this particular model, the cooperative enterprise with a signed agreement with the industrial permit holder (i.e., SODEMI) would have a de facto ASM authorization. As such, the “mining producer” would be the cooperative enterprise, which would then issue worker cards to its members, just as an ASM permit holder would be required to do in non-SODEMI zones.

22 A senior SODEMI official said he would be open to explore what a particular group proposes, but in principle seemed unenthusiastic about SODEMI agents partnering with some other organization in its territory.
repressive approach to ASM. This is especially possible for ASM gold, which as mentioned is experiencing a destructive “rush” situation. The worry would be that a solely repressive approach to this issue could have spillover effects for diamonds as well. As part of the KP compliance process, efforts are underway to sensitize the new leaders and attempt to have the spillover effects go the other direction. In other words, Côte d’Ivoire’s history with and progress in developing sound ASDM governance should inform the government ASM gold policy. It remains to be seen if the new leadership can be convinced of the pragmatic, ethical and economic benefits of treating ASM as a complex but legitimate economic activity requiring support and development like any other sector.

This is, of course, the key message of the Kimberley Process Washington Declaration, and the evolving institutional framework will determine to what extent Côte d’Ivoire will implement its policy actions. Unfortunately, the ministerial change occurred when the old ministry was in the process of identifying a new head of ASM who was to follow ASM issues within the KP, including the Washington Declaration. In the meantime, the KP Permanent Secretariat is the best forum to advance the Declaration’s implementation. The Secretariat has named a Washington Declaration point person, who is from the Ministry of the Interior, and there should soon be civil society involvement, thanks to a workshop with 20 NGOs held on August 28 in which the Washington Declaration was presented as a major opportunity for collaboration. Future programming should consider this institutional context as well, since many NGOs have the capacity and interest to support the holistic agenda of the WDDF, and outside partners may be better placed and better funded than the Secretariat to operationalize that collaboration.

23 While an artisanal and semi-industrial directorate exists, it is mainly a paper pusher for ASM authorizations, and its capacity for dealing with ASM policy is weak.

Socioeconomic Context

The decade of war and crisis has left mining communities in a dire state. Earnings from diamond mining, once the basis of the economy, have plummeted due to exploitative prices and the drying up of financing. The mosques and schools built with diamond money collected by the GVCs are in a state of disrepair. Yet diamond mining continues, and hopes are high that the anticipated lifting of the embargo accompanied with support programs will help reestablish some of the prosperity that was lost. This section puts some numbers on the socioeconomic situation and community aspirations by presenting the survey results (see Annex 3 for the questionnaire).

The first section (see Table 1) presents the demographic and socioeconomic aspects of the survey. The following highlights are of note:

- All respondents are men. This is not an artifact of the mining worker database, but a reality in the Séguela region: women are not allowed to mine, and this appears to be respected. (This is not the case in Tortiyya, however, where a limited number of migrant women and their children were observed mining.)
- The high average age (48) may be an artifact of the mining worker database, since older workers who remember the SODEMI system may be more likely to become registered. It is likely that many younger workers have not yet registered. In addition, many younger workers have either left diamond mining for good or have migrated for gold.
- Ivorians constitute around 80% of the respondents, with the remainder being citizens from other countries in the region. According to focus group discussions, the overall population is between 40 and 60% foreign. This may be a case of foreigners less likely to register as workers, or it may be due to the fact that many foreign mining workers have migrated to gold-producing areas.

In terms of income sources, while 90% of respondents reported income from diamonds in the last year, only 55% cited diamonds as their number one source of revenue. Interestingly, cashew farming is the second-most important activity, with 76% of respondents gaining income from them, and 23% saying it was their most important source of revenue. Indeed, while cashew farming was present prior to the crisis, focus group discussions revealed that it has generally increased. However, many villagers complained about the low prices for cashews in this year’s season.
Men’s time is dominated by diamond mining while women’s time is dominated by small business. The small business ranges from preparing certain foods to reselling hair products or pottery (see Figure 9). Small business development for women could be an important strategy to diversify livelihoods through focusing on women’s activities.

Nearly 20% of respondents spent time away from their villages for work reasons, and two-thirds stayed away for less than 3 months.

When asked to compare income this past year to previous years, the majority (69%) said that income this past year was worse or much worse.

To gauge income trends, respondents were asked to indicate their income range during their best month and their worst month during the past year. During their best months, nearly 50% of respondents reported income between 50,000 FCFA (US$100) and 250,000 FCFA (US$500). During their worst months, 42% of respondents said they earned nothing, and 30% said they earned less than 25,000 (US$50). The average daily income in the best months was 6,232 CFA (US$12.50) while the average daily income in the worst months was 422 CFA (US$0.84).

The income volatility evident in the above figures is striking. In some months miners lived well below the absolute poverty level, while in other months they earn nearly 15 times more.

The second section of the survey (see Table 2) presents the information on mining practices and behavior. The following highlights are of note:

Over 70% of respondents have mined diamonds for more than 20 years, and nearly 30% have mined all their lives. This demonstrates the extent to which ASDM is a long-established activity in these communities.

As noted early, some 87% of miners were active in the past year, but only 70% reported having found at least 1 diamond. 24

65% of miners said they were year-long miners, with only 20% saying they limited themselves to the dry season. This is different from other countries, and is due to the geological fact that Côte d’Ivoire has a number of alluvial and colluvial deposits (zamugu) which remain dry and accessible all year.

The discrepancy with the figure from section 1 noting that 90% of respondents reported income from diamonds in the past year can be explained by the fact that not all income from diamonds necessarily comes from having discovered a diamond. Financing can provide income, while locals can sometimes earn income from being the land tuteur of a foreign miner, from whom they are entitled a cut of revenue.

Table 1. Quantitative Survey Results: Demographic & Socioeconomic Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Men (100%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Age</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Number of Children</td>
<td>5.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Household Size (all dependents)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivorian Nationals</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Ivoirian Nationals</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Income Sources (in Previous Year)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Diamonds</th>
<th>Gold</th>
<th>Agriculture (not cacao or cashew)</th>
<th>Cashew Nuts</th>
<th>Animal Husbandry</th>
<th>Small Business</th>
<th>Hired Labor (non-diamond)</th>
<th>Salary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most Important Income Source

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity on which most time spent (Men)</th>
<th>Diamonds (53%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Activity on which most time spent (Women)</td>
<td>Small Business (54%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration Outside Village for Work in Past Year</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Spent Outside Village Among Migrants</td>
<td>Less than 3 months (66%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How Income in Recent Year Compared to Previous Years’ Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How Income Compared</th>
<th>Better or Much Better</th>
<th>24%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Worse or Much Worse</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Maximum Income Range in Best Month of Previous Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Greater Than 1,000,000 CFA</th>
<th>1%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>500,000 CFA to 1,000,000 CFA</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250,000 CFA to 500,000 CFA</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000 CFA to 250,000 CFA</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000 CFA to 100,000 CFA</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25,000 to 50,000</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 to 25,000 CFA</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average Income in Best Month of Previous Year

| Average | 186,962 CFA ($374) |

Average Daily Income in Best Month of Previous Year

| Average | 6,232 CFA ($12.50) |

Maximum Income Range in Worst Month of Previous Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Greater Than 1,000,000 CFA</th>
<th>0%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>500,000 CFA to 1,000,000 CFA</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250,000 CFA to 500,000 CFA</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000 CFA to 250,000 CFA</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000 CFA to 100,000 CFA</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25,000 to 50,000</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 to 25,000 CFA</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average Monthly Income in Worst Month of Previous Year

| Average | 12,652 CFA ($25) |

Average Daily Income in Best Month of Previous Year

| Average | 422 CFA ($0.84) |

24 The discrepancy with the figure from section 1 noting that 90% of respondents reported income from diamonds in the past year can be explained by the fact that not all income from diamonds necessarily comes from having discovered a diamond. Financing can provide income, while locals can sometimes earn income from being the land tuteur of a foreign miner, from whom they are entitled a cut of revenue.
Nearly all respondents owned their own shovel and artisanal jig, but nearly no one has a prospecting rod, showing the low level of prospecting knowledge. In addition, only 7% own a water pump, showing the potential of devising rental schemes for water pumps as a way to reduce the financial dependency of miners on their financiers.

Most miners found less than 6 diamonds in the past year. The average large diamond was 1.46 carats and the average small diamond was 0.31 carats.

Nearly all miners (92%) have a financial backer. Interestingly, 72% reported that their backer was from their village. This number, as well as focus group interviews in Bobi, demonstrates how outside financing has dried up, and people are turning to each other to get by.

In terms of the composition of the financing, 93% received money and 83% tools. Following sales, the financer does not get a cut in the sales proceeds but rather recuperates his investment by offering a low price for the stone. All miners reported that they sold their diamonds through their GVC.

Unlike in other countries, not a single conflict over limits was reported. This could be due to clear customary systems of organization, or other factors. The most common conflict reported was between cattle-herders and farmers, whose animals destroy crops.

12% of respondents reported that they refill their holes after mining, which is unsurprisingly low.

These data offer a snapshot of some key demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the miners in and around Séguéla. Other elements of these results will be integrated into the analysis of different programming options which begins in the following section.
Programming Options

Existing and Planned Interventions

With the exception of the technical assistance to the KP Secretariat funded by the EU, there are currently no development or technical support programs for ASDM in Côte d’Ivoire provided by any governmental or non-governmental actor.

Prior to the crisis, the only significant program was SODEMI’s work with its GVCs in Séguéla. Based on interviews with their agents present at the time, SODEMI provided technical advice and guidance, such as how to dig an open pit in such a way as to reduce the risk of collapse. However, there was no technical advice on diamond valuation and no provision of equipment or trainings on the geology of diamonds. It would appear as if state technical agents also provided a limited amount of such advice as well.

In terms of other peripheral programs or NGOs engaged in work in the diamond areas, there is currently none that is active in the field. The main Ivorian NGO with the mandate of researching and monitoring extractive industries (the Groupe de Recherche sur les Industries Extractives, or GRPIE), which is one of the 11 members of the KP Civil Society Coalition, has not visited Séguéla or Tortiya for a year, and no villagers encountered by the consultant were aware of their existence. Similarly, during the recent conference with 20 civil society organizations, a number expressed interest in being involved on issues ranging from health, human rights, and child labor, but none currently had any projects or programs deployed in the area.

This state of affairs points to the opportunity and critical need for support to these communities. Fortunately, in part thanks to progress towards KP compliance, a number of anticipated programs should be starting up in the coming months and years.

1. USAID and EU.

USAID and the EU will co-fund the Property Rights and Artisanal Diamond Development Program (PRADD) in Côte d’Ivoire. The program is the only one that is far along in the planning process and specifically targeted at ASDM diamond development. PRADD will run for a period of 5 years, and its funding level is anticipated to be around $1 million per year, though the exact figure is not yet known. As in the PRADD programs run in Liberia, Guinea and the Central African Republic between 2007 and 2013, the program aims at increasing the number of diamonds entering the legal chain of custody while improving the lives of artisanal diamond communities.

In Côte d’Ivoire, the following objectives have been defined:

a. Clarify property and diamond mining rights through select application of the 1998 land tenure law and a pilot conflict management program.

b. Strengthen internal controls through providing technical assistance to Ivorian KP authorities on policy issues, develop an ASM cadaster, support the GVCs and work on spreading them beyond SODEMI zones, design and implement a pilot program for registration of artisanal miners and recording/collection of production information

c. Expand economic development in mining communities through improving technical and financial knowledge of miners, and developing alternative livelihood schemes, especially aimed at women

d. Increase public awareness of the KP and relevant laws through a communications and awareness-raising scheme and solicit assistance from NGO partners in that regard

e. Design and implement an impact evaluation

USAID opened the procurement process for PRADD in July, and the program is expected to start before the end of the year.

2. World Bank

Requests for World Bank assistance must come from a high level of the beneficiary’s government. So far, the Mining Ministry has submitted requests for assistance for the following:

a. A limited grant ($30,000) to support the purchase of diamond valuation and other material support for the KP Permanent Secretariat. The senior mining specialist at the World Bank had urged the KP Permanent Secretary to apply for these discretionary funds, and the minister obliged. Unfortunately, the World Bank was unable to fulfill this request before a fiscal year procurement deadline. The World Bank has indicated its interest in supporting the KP process in Côte d’Ivoire through another mechanism, but there is not yet a concrete project or offer in place, nor funding level.
b. **Assistance to expand Côte d’Ivoire’s mining cadaster modernization program.** A World Bank-funded program that introduced the program FlexiCadastre ended in May 2013. The pilot program included a limited software license and some training. The government would like to acquire a full license, expand the effort and also spend on some auxiliary measures, such as equipping a strong cadaster service and creating a public online interface, like there is in the DRC. The consultant was unable to find an updated status on this request. FlexiCadastre would presumably allow the inclusion of ASM permits, although possibly not the ASM zones set aside by private companies like SODEMI.

c. **Assistance in the mining code revision process.** This was going to consist of a consultant to help guide the revision process, but the latest information is that the World Bank will fund a workshop on September 27 where all relevant government, private sector and civil society partners will discuss and finalize the proposed mining code draft.

### 3. South Africa

At the KP Intercessional in June 2013, South Africa indicated its interest in assisting the government of Côte d’Ivoire. The KP Permanent Secretary prepared a proposal that requested assistance from South Africa to develop an aerial surveillance program of diamond mining areas in order to assess diamond production potential and new areas for ground exploration. A number of maps were lost during the crisis, and this would help reconstitute geological data (WDDF Policy Action A2). South Africa has reportedly agreed to the request, but the South African embassy noted that such assistance could only be provided after the U.N. embargo lifts. There is no known funding level.

### 4. Belgium

The Ivoirian government submitted a request for technical assistance in diamond valuation capacity to the Belgian government. The government has responded favorably to the request, which would consist of 80,000 euros, implemented by the Antwerp World Diamond Center (AWDC). The assistance is anticipated to cover the following:

a. A one-week generalist diamond valuation training workshop in Côte d’Ivoire with a broad number of stakeholders from customs, the mining ministry, etc.

b. A fully paid training and internship at the Diamond House in Belgium for three Ivoirians, who will constitute Côte d’Ivoire’s expert valuators.

c. Development of a technical guide for diamond valuation to harmonize methodologies for assessing export tax revenues and values on the KP Certificate.

d. Diamond valuation equipment and financing the printing of new KP Certificates, as needed.

The deployment date of the experts and the finalization of this assistance is currently under discussion, but it would appear that movement will occur between October and December 2013.

### 5. Open Society Institute West Africa

The George Soros-funded Open Society Institute has indicated its interest in funding government or non-governmental institutions to implement projects that advance its objectives of supporting “the creation of open societies in West Africa marked by functioning democracy, good governance, the rule of law, basic freedoms, and widespread civic participation.”25 In a meeting with the KP customs representative, an OSIWA staff member indicated their interest in supporting KP compliance. The KP Permanent Secretary is currently pursuing this possible funding opportunity for the Secretariat. The Secretariat could also facilitate other civil society organizations to receive a grant through this mechanism. This is only a potential intervention, so no timeline or funding level is available.

### 6. UNEP

The consultant met with a UNEP team conducting a nationwide post-conflict environmental assessment, which includes a section on extractive resources. The team leader26 said that there were no immediate plans to establish a program based on the assessment, but that UN funding can sometimes coalesce on such reports. The consultant urged the team leader to take into consideration the environmental issues in ASDM, while also explaining progress towards KP compliance.

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26 Wynet Smith, a former member of the U.N. Group of Experts in Liberia.
Community feedback on interventions

Table 3 below presents the results of the third portion of the quantitative survey. The survey listed ten possible interventions based on initial focus group discussions and the WDDF. Respondents were then asked to indicate the importance of the intervention for them. Finally, respondents were asked to indicate their number one priority of the ten listed.

Most participants (24%) said they could not choose one priority, as they wanted them all. However, among those who did choose, the top three most popular intervention proposals were:

1. *Rehabilitating mined out areas into productive agriculture*
2. *Improving work tools*
3. *Improving diamond valuation knowledge*

Respondents were also invited to indicate any other priorities, and of the 37% who had other ideas, most related to agricultural support.

In terms of ranking interventions by their stated importance, the differences between the 10 proposed interventions were less marked. Improving tools was cited as “very important” by the most number of respondents while improving cooperatives’ organizational capacity was cited as “very important” by the least number of survey respondents. These results will be analyzed further in the following section.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number One Priority Interventions</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improve work tools</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve mining techniques</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-mechanized washing</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve prospection techniques</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve diamond valuation knowledge</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitate environment for agriculture</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improve organization capacity of cooperatives</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help cooperatives self-finance mining</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help miners diversify revenues</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support women’s socioeconomic activities</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All of the above; cannot choose just one</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most popular ideas not listed above (37% offered additional ideas)

| Agricultural support                                                  | 62%      |
| Animal husbandry                                                      | 19%      |

Interventions that are considered “very important”

| Improve work tools                                                    | 92%      |
| Improve mining techniques                                             | 91%      |
| Semi-mechanized washing                                               | 89%      |
| Improve prospection techniques                                         | 87%      |
| Improve diamond valuation knowledge                                   | 89%      |
| Rehabilitate environment for agriculture                               | 75%      |
| Improve organization capacity of cooperatives                         | 65%      |
| Help cooperatives self-finance mining                                 | 74%      |
| Help miners diversify revenues                                       | 80%      |
| Support women’s socioeconomic activities                              | 85%      |
Analysis and Recommendations

Information from all methodological tools used during this study – semi-structured interviews, participatory methods, and the quantitative survey – form the basis for the following analysis. As described above, the Washington Declaration Diagnostic Framework (WDDF) organizes the analysis. For each of the 11 policy action areas, the following areas are presented:

1. **Situation Overview**, which describes the issues underlying the policy action area.

2. **SWOT Analysis**, which offers a summary of **Strengths**, **Weaknesses**, **Opportunities** and **Threats**. Strengths and weaknesses offer a diagnostic of the policy area, opportunities presents possible ways to build on strengths and correct weaknesses, and threats identifies risks or other reasons why intervening in this sphere is unnecessary or undesirable.

3. **Government priorities**, which summarizes government stakeholder views.

4. **Community priorities**, which summarizes ASDM community stakeholder views.

5. **Recommendations**, which offer the consultant’s views on if and how to best act to further the policy action and policy goal in question, both by the government and outside partners.
POLICY GOAL A. TO IMPROVE FORMALIZATION OF ARTISANAL MINING

POLICY ACTION A1: LOWER FEES AND INCREASE ACCESSIBILITY OF MINING LICENSES

SITUATION OVERVIEW

Côte d’Ivoire is in an unusual situation in that it is preparing for a KP review visit and implementing a newly a licensing system mostly from scratch. Progress has been encouraging: to date 997 mining worker cards, backed by a computer database, have been issued. There are a number of logistical challenges, however, and after the pressure from the KP review visit subsides, it is unclear to what extent the local mining administration will continue to keep the system in place.

STRENGTHS

- Good fiscal incentives for professional licenses (free in 2013 pilot phase, $10 per year thereafter)
- Encourages self-organization, since each mining producer must account for all workers under his responsibility
- Remains flexible and conforms to reality: SODEMI workers can move freely between different cooperatives’ mining sites, as per local practice

WEAKNESSES

- A full artisanal and semi-industrial diamond license is still administratively cumbersome
- The system requires miners to come to regional centers; this is problematic for more remote villages
- Compared to industrial mining, ASDM has weak rights. In SODEMI areas, their rights are precarious, and in other situations, any discovery of rich kimberlitic deposits much be reported to the government.

OPPORTUNITIES

- Monitoring and making sure that registration continues
- Apply lessons learned from Séguela registration drive to the situation in Tortiya, such as organizing new mining cooperatives
- Communication campaigns to make sure that the importance of licensing and consequences are made clear.
- Offer clear services in exchange for procuring a professional license, such as being able to rent from an equipment rental pool

THREATS

- The ministerial change could result in a change of policy on the free mining cards
- There is evidence of non-miners applying for and receiving mining worker cards
- Unclear how the registration system will unfold in non-SODEMI zones
- A government bias towards industrial exploitation results in the undermining of the system

GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES

This is a high priority for the government due to the upcoming KP review visit.

COMMUNITY PRIORITIES

Licensing fees is not cited as a problem or priority. In general, formalization is not cited as a major priority either, since illegal miners are currently not subject to harassment by the government. This will likely change as the government and SODEMI beings enforcement, in which case formalization may become more important.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This is good area for the government to continue focusing on, but there is little need for outside intervention at this point, as the government has the capacity to continue the program. Outside organizations could offer indirect formalization incentives like service provision made conditional to proper licensing. It is also important in the context of A1 to continue following the new ministry’s policy towards ASM.
**POLICY ACTION A2: ENHANCED DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS**

**SITUATION OVERVIEW**

Much of the existing geological data, including detailed maps and research studies conducted by SODEMI, were lost during the war. Demographic data on miners is also lacking. In general, geological data is seen as either proprietary or of national security interest, making arguments to offer data to ASDM actors a difficult proposition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRENGTHS</th>
<th>WEAKNESSES</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>» Some demographic data collected</td>
<td>» Severe lack of geological data</td>
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<tr>
<td>» World Bank-funded program instituted computerized Flexicadastre program</td>
<td>» Lack of demographic information and in-depth environmental assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>» USGS has a long-term and ongoing program of remote sensing monitoring and analysis</td>
<td>» New data on the number of miners and other demographic data missing</td>
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<td></td>
<td>» Capacity in the ministry’s cadaster management sub-directorate is low</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPPORTUNITIES</th>
<th>THREATS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>» Partnerships with SODEMI to create and share geological research results</td>
<td>» Government institutions, including SODEMI, tend to be reluctant to share geological information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» As part of geological studies, determine strategies to diversify materials mined, such as selling used gravel in Tortiya</td>
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<tr>
<td>» Involve civil society on demographic data collection and analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>» Support the World Bank’s plans to expand the support to develop a mining cadaster program, and ensure that ASDM is integrated</td>
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</table>

**GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES**

Aerial surveying and renewed prospection by international companies.

**COMMUNITY PRIORITIES**

Prospection and identification of new deposits. Some communities are interested in trainings on how to do prospection themselves, but most would prefer outside geologists to tell them where to dig next, according to focus group discussions.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

This is a useful area of focus, especially since there is the possibility to leverage partnerships with USGS and South Africa. Community-based training and material support in prospection of new ASDM areas, in collaboration with SODEMI, could complement the aerial efforts. This would be delicate to negotiate with the government, but feasible. In Tortiya, propose a comprehensive new geological survey to assess remaining deposits and reallocate all lots based on real potential, both for diamonds but other substances. Because this would be a complex process, it is probably wise to link to the World Bank’s planned expanded cadaster programming as well as PRADD’s land use planning and conflict mitigation components.
**POLICY ACTION A3: STRENGTHEN PROPERTY RIGHTS**

**SITUATION OVERVIEW**

In Séguéla, customary tenure is generally strong and is a key reason for the success of the SODEMI model. However, there are varying degrees of legitimacy of land chiefs, which can create variable systems. The only potential land conflicts have to do with the extent of village terroir. Mapping this could be useful but could also stir up conflict unnecessarily. In addition, the tutorat system whereby outsiders must have a local sponsor is still practiced. This appears to work without problems, but there is the possibility of exploitation. Another source of conflict involving land is the issue of cattle destroying crops. In Tortiya, the situation is very different. The customary authority is weak and confused, with 2 competing villages and the state rejecting any customary authority. There are potentially significant conflicts brewing between the union of ASM permit holders and cashew farmers who have settled on the land in those mining areas (see photo). Local authorities suggest asking the mining permit holders to leave, but a durable solution is only possible with application of the 1998 rural tenure law so that mining permits can no longer be used as de facto land titles.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRENGTHS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>When it works, customary authority is very effective at stopping fraud</td>
<td>Migrant labor rights may cause problems in the future as their access to land is restricted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SODEMI model is an example of state recognition of customary systems</td>
<td>Tortiya’s land use conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The local administration (sous-préfets) play a positive role in dispute resolution</td>
<td>The 500 lots in Tortiya are outdated</td>
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<td></td>
<td>In practice surface/subsurface rights are not always clear</td>
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<tr>
<th>OPPORTUNITIES</th>
<th>THREATS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Update the lots in Tortiya based on real geological deposits and land use</td>
<td>Land tenure is a highly politicized issue, and is a cause of the civil war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apply the 1998 land law, especially in Tortiya.</td>
<td>As industrial activity grows, risk of expropriation and conflicts involving ASDM miners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explore programs to clarify village terroir in Bobi</td>
<td>Clarification of individual property rights in villages like Bobi could undermine a successful model.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES**

This is not viewed as a priority within the Mining Ministry, but land tenure clarification in general is a priority for the government as a whole, especially given a recent national law extending the implementation time for the 1998 law to 2023.27

**COMMUNITY PRIORITIES**

This area is a major priority in Tortiya, but not a priority at all in Séguéla.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

Focus interventions in this area on Tortiya, and take a comprehensive land-use planning approach combined with implementing the 1998 law. Steps could include socioeconomic, geological and land tenure mapping followed by public for a mediated by local authorities and the launch of the property certificate system as per the 1998 land law. In Séguéla, attempt to preserve the positive effects of customary land tenure in effective ASDM governance while increasing safeguards in the GVCs to prevent the negative effects of corrupt village chiefs.

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**POLICY ACTION A4: FINANCIAL TRANSPARENCY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE**

**SITUATION OVERVIEW**

The ongoing efforts to become KP-compliant are a positive force in promoting financial transparency and good governance, and complement other efforts, such as the successful finalization of Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) compliance in May. The registration and commercial traceability system currently under implementation (see photo at left showing a diamond sale being registered by the cooperative) exemplifies many best practices in this area, including the establishment of unique IDs in computerized databases that are linked to all production and sales data. While a perfect chain of custody from mine to export and beyond is practically impossible with diamonds, the system being unveiled will leave sufficient paper trails to allow audits and other practices of good governance. In the KP compliance process, the concerns and realities of ASDM have been amply taken into consideration. However, monitoring the implementation of all systems and ensuring an ongoing consultative process will be necessary once the pressure and external attention from the KP compliance process have ended.

**STRENGTHS**

- Registration of all producers and sales entities
- Receipt system links registration IDs to all transactions
- EITI compliance recently achieved
- Banks are available in diamond-producing areas
- The SODEMI model goes beyond state-mandated transparency and uses social pressure and financial incentives by customary authorities
- The government plans on setting export tax rates at 3% to be in harmony with neighboring countries
- The KP process has included extensive consultations with ASDM miners which has helped ensure a system that corresponds to their realities

**WEAKNESSES**

- Little to no transactions through banking channels currently, and this is unlikely to change in the short and medium term
- ASM actors are not formally represented in the mining code revision process, and no civil society actors are championing their interests either.
- Mining policy declaration documents are not mandated by law like in other countries.

**OPPORTUNITIES**

- As part of the mining code revision process and its adoption, major opportunity to promote the creation of an ASM and/or ASDM policy declaration document.
- Dissemination and sensitization on the new laws and regulations following full adoption

**THREATS**

- SODEMI’s permit areas cover the vast majority of diamond producing areas in Côte d’Ivoire. SODEMI has ambitions to possibly expand to other areas, like Tortiya. Vigilance by all actors should ensure that SODEMI is prevented from monopolistic behavior.\(^{28}\)
- Failure to repress or integrate smuggling networks will undermine good governance.

**GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES**

Good governance and financial transparency is a high priority for the government because doing so will help improve its image with investors abroad. The current government has staked much of its legitimacy on its ability to create jobs and spark impressive economic growth, and attracting FDI is the cornerstone of its strategy. It should be noted, however, that the government is not a unitary body, and the U.N. has repeatedly pointed to the likelihood that former rebel elements still have interests in improper natural resource extraction, including diamonds.\(^{29}\)

**COMMUNITY PRIORITIES**

The communities’ main priorities are to get the embargo lifted and regain access to financing. As such, buy-in for KP requirements has been impressive, since they are framed as necessary to get the embargo lifted. However, after the pressure lifts, it is less clear if this will remain a priority.\(^{30}\)

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

This is an area that requires ongoing vigilance, and supporting local civil society organizations in this role could be beneficial. In addition, advocacy for the development and adoption of an official ASM strategy document by the government could help enshrine progressive principles and practices so as to avoid going backwards as institutions change.

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\(^{28}\) SODEMI was recently prevented from inserting language into the ministerial decree that authorized its organizing of miners that would have allowed the company to also enter into exclusive purchase agreements with GVCs. Monopolistic behavior would undermine the SODEMI model, since instead of having an incentive to ensure transparency and maximum prices for miners to maximize its 8% tax, SODEMI would have the incentive to reduce transparency and pressure villagers to accept lower prices. To avoid this conflict of interest, the government has instructed SODEMI to separate its ASDM support efforts from any plans to establish a buying house, but continued vigilance is essential.

\(^{29}\) S/RES/2013/228

\(^{30}\) Diarabana has been cited as an example of a case where customary authorities collaborated with rebel formers for their own benefit and at the expense of miners.
### POLICY ACTION A5: EMPOWER ARTISANAL MINERS TO ENGAGE WITH BUYERS AND INVESTORS

#### SITUATION OVERVIEW

The situation in this policy area is mixed. On the one hand, access to any form of investment—direct or indirect—has all but dried up in the last decade, as evidenced by the survey result showing that over 70% of financing comes from fellow villagers. Existing miners are more vulnerable than ever to unscrupulous actors, as evidenced by the drop in average price per carat from $124 in 2001 to $16.80 in 2007, cited above. In addition, while the existence of a well-organized “cooperative” system prior to the crisis should inspire hope, these cooperatives never engaged in actions which would empower miners financially. On the other hand, miners in Séguéla already have experience with organizing production and sales, which is more than many mining communities elsewhere. Miners are desperate for financing and therefore open to any number of schemes, and the fact that GVCs like Bobi continued to function despite occupation by rebels and a vacuum of the state shows the extent to which organizational capacity was due only to SODEMI’s field presence.

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<tr>
<th>STRENGTHS</th>
<th>WEAKNESSES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>» Legal framework allows multiple forms of organization, including cooperative enterprises</td>
<td>» Cooperatives have never sold collectively, managed outside financing, or organized any financial or material support to their members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» Robust social cohesion in some groups</td>
<td>» Currently no access to finance for cooperatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» Introduction of a simplified and regionally harmonized cooperative framework</td>
<td>» It is illegal for cooperatives to export unless they form or work through a buying house</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPPORTUNITIES</th>
<th>THREATS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>» Trainings and ongoing support to build “real” cooperatives</td>
<td>» Existing collectors may attempt to undermine attempts to foster financial autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» Training in marketing and financial aspects of diamond mining</td>
<td>» Cultural barriers to overcoming the patronage system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» If volume becomes sufficient, and production is self-financed, experimentation with a bourse system.</td>
<td>» Managing the unique risk profile of diamond mining is a challenge. GVC presidents said they never did financing before because of the risk of losing money. They prefer for the collectors to bear this risk, even though miners end up losing out in the end.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» Form a buying house run by a union of cooperatives for exporting. It is possible that such a buying house could obtain exemption from licensing fees through ministerial decree.</td>
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#### GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES

The government prioritizes support to cooperatives, but mainly as a way to bring some order to the sector rather than as a way for them to become financially empowered. Government discourse on investment is heavily biased towards industrial development.

#### COMMUNITY PRIORITIES

Access to finance and financial empowerment is one of the most important priorities for all mining communities encountered.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

This is a vital area of action full of opportunities for innovation. Different configurations are possible. One would be for a consortium of foreign buyers in the “fair trade” or “development diamond” market to fund a field-based collector to buy quality stones from cooperatives. The collector could export via an existing buying house or as the initiative grows, investors could co-fund the creation of the cooperatives’ own buying house. Concurrently, pilot initiatives to finance cooperatives could be tested, with a right of first purchase by the field-based collector for stones from mining in which they have a stake. The associated project or NGO could provide technical assistance to reduce risks and assure that development standards are met. The consortium of interested buyers could then make their own arrangements for cutting and polishing, thus creating the possibility of traceable “development” diamonds.
**POLICY ACTION A6: EXPAND ACCESS TO MINING INPUTS**

**SITUATION OVERVIEW**

ASDM activity in Côte d’Ivoire is conducted in a very rudimentary fashion, even by artisanal standards. The quantitative survey revealed that near no miner had heard of or used prospection techniques or equipment, such as the sonde used in the Central African Republic. Most miners own their own shovel and artisanal jig, but access to tools are still used as part of financing that keeps them bound to their financiers. As for diamond valuation knowledge, this is also shockingly weak. Miners and even GVC leaders lack even the most basic knowledge of the “4 C’s”. Miners routinely sell fantasy colored stones at a steep discount because they are not “clean.” Several cooperative heads believe that if left fallow, diamonds will regrow after 20 years or so. Meanwhile, the easiest deposits have been mostly mined out. In focus group interviews, numerous villages cited the issue that deposits are located deeper and deeper, or near active rivers that require complex and risky dams to access. Some mining communities in Séguéla have indicated that they are only interested in restarting mining if there is some measure of semi-mechanization, or support in transporting gravel from the site of extraction to the washing point.

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<tr>
<th>STRENGTHS</th>
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<tr>
<td>» Compared to other countries, mining areas are not extremely remote, and are near decent commercial centers where inputs are available</td>
<td>» There has never been government or SODEMI support to launch equipment rental pools or semi-mechanization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» There is a strong will and interest in improving mining techniques, as evidenced by “improving tools” being the number 2 priority in the quantitative survey</td>
<td>» Tools are used to perpetuate dependence on financiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» Valuation capacity is extraordinarily weak</td>
<td>» Valuation capacity is extraordinarily weak</td>
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<tr>
<th>OPPORTUNITIES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>» Opportunities to procure inexpensive and locally built semi-industrial mining equipment</td>
<td>» Semi-mechanization may end up leading to the loss of jobs, especially for those involved in manual washing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» Equipment rental schemes, either privately run or as part of cooperatives</td>
<td>» Collectors would likely be opposed to diamond valuation training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» Improved mining techniques</td>
<td>» Improving access to inputs and techniques will have little effect without improved geological knowledge of new and remaining deposits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» Financial literacy and certificate programs in diamond business management</td>
<td>» The nature of existing deposits may favor industrial exploitation, especially those that are too deep to mine using the dangerous “shaft and gallery” methods</td>
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<td>» Valuation training, including establishing an in-house valuation expert for each cooperative</td>
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**GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES**

Modernization of the ASDM sector is a big priority. The challenge will be to do so in a way that is not biased towards industrial production, but rather improves the efficiency and output of artisanal operations, thereby preserving the poverty-reduction potential of the activity.

**COMMUNITY PRIORITIES**

Modernization of the ASDM sector is a big priority. The introduction of a centralized washing plant was a popular suggestion in the quantitative survey and in follow-up focus group meetings. Some communities, such as Masala-Assolo, have said they have no interest in returning to diamond mining unless there is significant investment and semi-industrialization. To the left, a locally built washing unit prototype built by an Italian in Tortiya.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

As long as accompanied by renewed prospection and geological surveys, improving techniques and access to mining inputs will be an effective and welcome strategy to improve the lives and livelihoods of ASDM operators. Introducing terracing methods will improve safety and environmental management. Developing equipment rental pools and developing centralized processing facilities will help modernize the sector while also providing additional revenue streams for cooperatives. This policy action area should be a priority for intervention programs.

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31 While visiting Tortiya, the consultant met an Italian engineer who is installing a diamond washing machine that he designed and built in the nearby town of Korhogo. He has plans to provide such equipment to miners and mining cooperatives. This could dramatically reduce the cost of equipment, which generally comes from South Africa.
POLICY GOAL B. TO IMPROVE SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN ASM COMMUNITIES

POLICY ACTION B1: SUPPORT COMPLIMENTARY LIVELIHOODS IN ASM COMMUNITIES

SITUATION OVERVIEW

Diamond revenue formed the backbone of local economies in Séguela and Tortiya prior to the crisis. The income naturally facilitated the diversification of livelihoods, since disposable income was used to hire workers to maintain agricultural fields, or to embark on small commerce exercises. From all accounts, villages like Bobi and Diarabana thrived. The drying up of diamond revenue during the crisis has led to a general depression in the economy, and this has affected other sectors. Agriculture has been the main fallback for miners. Cashew farming and subsistence crops have increased in importance for mining households, but production levels are hampered due to the inability to finance labor, tractors and other equipment, low market prices and difficulty in accessing inputs like herbicides and pesticides. Improving the diamond economy will automatically have positive effects on agriculture and other sectors. Support of this diversification—especially for women, who are not involved in mining in Séguela—could have positive ripple effects the other way. For example, increased agricultural revenue or small business operations related to diamond mining (like equipment rental operations) could help finance diamond mining. Existing agricultural cooperatives should make this more effective as well.

STRENGTHS | WEAKNESSES
--- | ---
» Presence of government agents to support rural livelihoods32  
» Côte d’Ivoire has a deep and successful agricultural heritage  
» Livelihoods are already diversified; support to diamond and non-diamond activities could have amplifying effects for both types |  
» Difficult to access to start-up capital for alternative activities  
» Danger of a destruction of agricultural sites because of renewed mining. In the past, numerous rice-producing flatlands were destroyed by mining.

OPPORTUNITIES | THREATS
--- | ---
» Involve the cooperative enterprises in promoting livelihood diversification of complementary activities.  
» Rice and fish farming present an excellent opportunity due to favorable geography in many villages in Seguela  
» Mining diamond by-products like gravel (mainly in Tortiya)  
» Opportunities for women and women groups, which are already active  
» Animal husbandry is practiced by only 17% of survey respondents, but this could be a good income opportunity  
» Collaboration with other local NGOs |  
» Increased mining will result in the loss of farmland, especially cashew tree groves

GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES

Côte d’Ivoire has a strong agricultural economy. The government has embarked on a program to become self-sufficient in rice by 2016, coordinated by a dedicated government agency.33 In the Séguela region, efforts under this initiative could be combined with environmental restoration of flood plains destroyed by diamond mining. (Photo on the left: A rice paddy near Séguela.)

COMMUNITY PRIORITIES

Agricultural support is a majority community priority. Both men and women want technical support, material support (including tractors), and the idea of converting old mining sites into productive agricultural areas was the most popular intervention in the Séguela survey.

RECOMMENDATIONS

An incoming-generating rehabilitation program could work well, given the importance of agriculture and the mined out areas suitable for rice production and fish farming. A survey of these areas should discover if they are truly mined out. If not, they should not be converted, unless the village decides to classify the area for agriculture only. Collaborate with local and national NGOs involved in agriculture to provide support for this development, especially to women’s groups. Finally, encourage the village-based cooperatives to become more involved by perhaps diverting a portion of their revenue to offer micro-loans to the wives of mining members as capital for their economic activities. In collaboration with a project or local organization, these “microfinance” pilots could work as precursors and “trial runs” that build the trust and capacity necessary to later launch cooperative-based or cooperative-managed diamond mining loans to members.

32 Agence National de Développement Rural (ANADER)
The history and organization of the GVCs in the SODEMI zones has been presented earlier. As noted, the successful organizing of miners bodes well for future interventions, and the continued functioning of certain GVCs like Bobi during the crisis shows how such organization was resilient. However, these cooperatives did not achieve much in terms of raising or managing working capital. All financing arrangements were and still are informal, marked by relationships of social and monetary indebtedness with exploitative intermedias. Access to working capital outside of these patronage systems is perhaps the key to unleashing the development potential of ASDM in most producing countries, and Côte d’Ivoire is no exception. One advantage Côte d’Ivoire has over other countries is a long history of “cooperative” culture, including a history of cooperative-based loans in the agricultural sector. Of course, the mining sector is unlike the agricultural sector, and the diamond sector is unlike gold or other minerals. The risk profile is complex, and one reason why the old patronage networks persist is that forcing miners to accept unfairly low prices is a strategy for collectors to cover their inevitable losses incurred elsewhere. Many miners would prefer that the risks not be taken upon themselves, and this has contributed to their position. Nevertheless, Côte d’Ivoire could provide fertile ground to pilot some innovative self-financing efforts.

### STRENGTHS

- No real “rush” situations currently, which are often characterized by chaos
- State has taken very proactive approach to organizing miners since 1986
- The SODEMI model a prime example of the development potential of ASDM, with the taxes having a similar policy effect as a return of export revenues to mining communities
- Positive “cooperative culture”

### WEAKNESSES

- Most GVCs did not survive the war, and will require significant support
- SODEMI model vulnerable to elite capture by unscrupulous leaders.
- No special incentives for cooperatives under the law in terms of export taxes.
- There is little understanding or capacity in the government to support the unique challenges of cooperative mining.
- Civil society organizations are not involved in diamond mining
- The Poverty Reduction Strategy Document does not mention ASM.

### OPPORTUNITIES

- Professionalize cooperatives as part of transition to new OHADA form.
- Involve international investors in building cooperative capacity
- Collaborate with civil society to support capacity development of miner organizations
- Assist cooperatives to offer health insurance schemes, since these are often part of the patronage system.

### THREATS

- Return of chaotic “rush” situations if new productive deposits are discovered
- Monopolistic behavior by SODEMI or others could undermine empowerment of ASDM groups
- Increased industrial activity could marginalize ASDM

### GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES

The government dislikes chaotic mining situations, hence its action in the 60s and the 80s to “establish order” in diamond mining, and its current deliberations on how to deal with ASM gold. As such, organizing miners is a government priority, though it has largely “outsourced” this responsibility to SODEMI. Supporting the developing of working capital through cooperatives is less of a priority compared to industrial development.

### COMMUNITY PRIORITIES

Access to working capital is a major priority for communities, and as noted above, they are open to a variety of options and configurations. The quantitative survey found that helping cooperatives become better organized was the least popular idea of the 10 proposed.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

The policy action area is closely linked A6, linking miners with foreign investors. Access to working capital and an ability to manage such capital is fundamental to make such direct marketing schemes work. These policy action areas should therefore be treated together. While there is no guarantee that creating “real” mining cooperatives in Côte d’Ivoire with access to international markets will work, the country’s history places it in a good position for possible success. Involvement of local NGOs in this process is a key opportunity. One idea recently advanced in the KP Secretariat would be to hire grown children of miners who have studied in Abidjan to provide financial and organizational support to cooperatives. Such ideas could be funded or coordinated by NGO micro-grants, and in the long term financed by the cooperatives themselves. These types of integrated solutions could take the mining cooperatives to the next level in their development.

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34 In the time of the first president Houphoët-Boigny, the state allowed and helped farming cooperatives offer loans to their members with a 10% interest rate, according to a stakeholder interview in Masala-Asolo.

35 The financiers will often pay medical bills as part of their financing of mining operations.
POLICY ACTION B3: MITIGATE ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE

SITUATION OVERVIEW

The environmental damage from ASDM in Côte d’Ivoire is typical of damage elsewhere: open pits, habitat destruction, waterway destruction, and loss of agricultural land. Because the most active mining occurred in the 80s and 90s, many areas are abandoned, but there are few areas that have been classified completely “mined out” due to haphazard exploitation. Both Séguela and Tortiya employ the round shaft and gallery systems for deeper gravel layers, sometimes as deep as 30 meters. Cases of cattle and other animals falling in are common, but no accounts of human deaths were heard. The quantitative survey showed that 12% of respondents reported refilling holes. The regulatory framework for environmental management is weak. Unlike industrial or quarry mining, ASM authorizations do not require environmental impact assessments. The application decree of the mining decree contains generalities about proper environmental management for ASM actors, but there are no enforcement mechanisms. On the industrial side, actors are required to pay into an environmental rehabilitation fund, but this does not apply to ASM activities. The Mining Ministry does have one junior officer charged with monitoring environmental and occupational health and safety issues, but there is no regular monitoring or intervention programs.

STRENGTHS

» Most mining is not near protected areas.
» In Tortiya, much mining is on already degraded land.
» Geographical opportunities to restore areas into fish ponds and rice farming
» SODEMI used to provide technical advice on mining techniques that would mitigate environmental impact

WEAKNESSES

» There is little regulatory or legal oversight of environmental management in ASDM
» No representatives of the Environment Ministry in the areas of mining
» No funds for environmental rehabilitation

OPPORTUNITIES

» Income-based environmental restoration by conversion of mined out areas into fish ponds or rice paddies
» Co-finance restorations with mining and agricultural cooperatives as part of a livelihood diversification scheme.
» Develop non-financial incentives, such as providing access to tools or financing only if environmental standards met
» Conditional purchase of heavy equipment, like a bulldozer, for use in environmental restoration and agricultural development.
» Introduce improved mining techniques, especially terracing.

THREATS

» There is little sense of what areas are truly “mined out”, so there is the risk of reopening rehabilitated sites

GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES

Environmental rehabilitation is not a government priority. However, as mentioned in B1, national agriculture programs like the rice initiative could pair nicely with environmental rehabilitation of wetland areas.

COMMUNITY PRIORITIES

While addressing the environmental damage in and of itself is low on the priority list for ASDM communities, support for agricultural diversification is high on the list. Linking these two through income-generation environmental rehabilitation is well-received, and is in fact the top choice among the survey respondents in this study.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The best way to ensure environmental rehabilitation is to make sure that there are economic incentives to do so. Smarter mining techniques that increase productivity while improving the environment are a good idea. Offering a cost-share approach to environmental rehabilitation of rice-producing areas is another potential idea where people see the interest in doing so. In addition, Séguela in particular has much potential in terms of fish farming, and quality tilapia and carpe fingerlings are available near Abidjan. Environmental damage mitigation will benefit from land-use planning approaches, especially in Tortiya. Areas need to be officially declared mined out, or officially designated for agriculture, and this can only occur after the necessary information is gathered and consultations completed. Finally, this policy action area offers a good framework for collaborating with other development projects, government initiatives and civil society organizations, mainly through the potential to link interventions to agriculture and food security.
The Ivoirian government is currently engaged in a positive and thorough process of legal and regulatory harmonization as part of Kimberley Process compliance. In addition, the KP Secretariat has emerged as an effective mechanism for inter-ministerial collaboration and coordination on diamond issues. One weakness is the lack of involvement from more peripheral but just as important ministries, including environment, forests, and especially agriculture, who manage implementation of the 1998 land tenure law. Unfortunately, the new mining code does not anticipate creating an inter-ministerial mechanism to coordinate mining policy. The competitive turf battles between ministries often make such mechanisms difficult to accept and implement. The key question moving forward is whether the KP Secretariat will continue to provide a forum and process for policy formulation and harmonization when it comes to ASDM. The new ministry does not appear convinced that the Secretariat plays a vital function in this regard, although there is currently advocacy underway to change the right minds.

### STRENGTHS

- New mining code shared with all relevant ministries for harmonization
- Regional harmonization of taxes at 3% based on informal consultations with Mano river countries
- Côte d’Ivoire participation in the EU-funded Mano River regional harmonization and knowledge-sharing initiative in 2013-2014.
- KP Secretariat represents key services from four ministries

### WEAKNESSES

- No formal inter-ministerial coordination mechanism or body to harmonize mining policy
- No clear government authority charged to crack down on illegal mining, such as a mining brigade
- Law enforcement of mining violations is currently weak

### OPPORTUNITIES

- Préfet and sous-prêfets can play a coordination role at a local level
- Land-use planning in Tortiya could result in harmonization
- Formalize some kind of ASM union to represent interests at a national level
- Côte d’Ivoire’s KP compliance system has adopted a number of best practices which should be tested and shared with other countries in the region
- Collaboration and projects focused around the Washington Declaration could foster inter-sectorial collaboration

### THREATS

- Ministries tend to be suspicious of coordination initiatives. It is usually better to foster coordination indirectly, such as through a particular project.
- Advances in regional harmonization of export tax rates may be undermined by other countries raising taxes.

### GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES

The government has prioritized finalizing an investment-friendly mining code by the end of the year, and has taken exceptional measures to accelerate the process, including passing control of the process to the prime minister.

### COMMUNITY PRIORITIES

Communities have not expressed needs or concerns related to harmonization of legal frameworks.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

Besides completing the mining code revision process, comprehensive land-use planning in Tortiya is the largest opportunity in this policy area, which overlaps in this case with property rights clarification. Tortiya is the site of land conflicts and has the benefit of a history of land-use planning through the establishment of the mining lots. An extended process involving geological mapping, socioeconomic mapping and property rights clarification could lead to the development of a comprehensive development plan that would harmonize a number of conflicting activities, especially agriculture and mining. In addition, the formation of a union of ASM miners to represent their interests at a national level could be beneficial, especially since there is currently no NGO that does so. Finally, any projects should plan from the outset to involve multiple local government agencies in implementation as a strategy for harmonization and coordination.
POLICY ACTION B5: OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND WORKER SAFETY

SITUATION OVERVIEW

This is an area overall neglected by the government and civil society actors. In terms of occupational health, communities expressed the need for better healthcare, but this was not limited to mines. Injuries do occur, but fortunately not to the extent at which they occur in ASM gold mining, and without the added issues related to mercury and explosive use. Nevertheless, shaft and gallery mining continues in diamond areas, and poorly constructed open pits do collapse, resulting in injury. Children are often present in the mines. Finally, the issue of migrant populations is important to take into consideration, since they are often more vulnerable than locals. In good periods for mining, foreigners outnumber locals, and many live without their families. Further study is needed to understand the needs of these populations, as well as the general issues in this policy action area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRENGTHS</th>
<th>WEAKNESSES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>» There is a point person in the Mining Ministry who focuses on these issues</td>
<td>» The Mining Ministry point person has no resources for monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» As part of its work, SODEMI offered technical advice to increase safety</td>
<td>» There is no database or risk assessment monitoring framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» In the new agreement with cooperative enterprises, SODEMI bans the practice of shaft and gallery mining.</td>
<td>» There is no sensitization and enforcement of regulations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» The mining code calls for occupational health and safety regulations, but these have not been defined</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPPORTUNITIES</th>
<th>THREATS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>» Fund the Mining Ministry point person to coordinate monitoring, develop regulations and develop sensitization programs.</td>
<td>» Cultural barriers (adulthood begins at 10 years of age in some communities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» Improved mining techniques</td>
<td>» Remaining deposits tend to be deeper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» Enforcement of child labor laws</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>» Include safety equipment as part of mining input interventions.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES

The environmental and social issues in ASM gold are attracting negative attention, so these issues are becoming an increasing priority. The government is leaning towards a repressive approach to ASM gold, and this could have spillover effects in diamond mining.

COMMUNITY PRIORITIES

Overall issues of access to healthcare and education remain high community priorities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Support the government in developing regulations that are specific to certain types of deposits and certain depths. This will only be possible after prospection and geological mapping of remaining deposits. Certain practices such as shaft mining should be banned, but semi-industrial alternatives with more rigorous safety standards should be explored. Trainings on improved mining techniques will also have a positive effect in improving safety and health. Finally, civil society organizations can become involved in monitoring these issues in collaboration with the government.
Conclusion

It could be argued that supporting the artisanal and small-scale diamond sector in Côte d’Ivoire is less of a priority compared with other countries. The scale of current activity is small, its importance to the economy at large negligible, and prospects for future growth uncertain. However, in the course of this research, three reasons stand out for why ASDM projects make sense:

1. The timing is opportune, as the country appears poised to emerge from a decade of isolation and community impatience can be harnessed for rapid buy-in.

2. The political context is still fragile, with the U.N. still concerned about instability and the role that natural resources could play, so having as many organizations as possible help reestablish good diamond governance is vital.

3. The potential impact is large, given the political and community will, and Côte d’Ivoire’s track record of innovation and progressive policies, despite the decade-long crisis. It is therefore fertile ground to test interventions, such as direct marketing by cooperatives, which could have ripple effects in ASM gold and other ASDM countries.

In the view of the consultant, DDI is well-positioned to contribute, and could focus on one or more of the following groupings of WDDF policy actions:

1. A5, A6, B2 (Empower Artisanal Miners to Engage with Buyers and Investors; Expand Access to Mining Inputs; Working Capital and Organization). This grouping would focus on supporting miners as they organize and seek alternative and independent forms of financing. In other words, the focus is on economic development of the ASDM sector.

2. B1, B3, B5 (Support complimentary livelihoods in ASM communities; Mitigate environmental damage; Occupational health and worker safety). This grouping would focus on issues such as agriculture, income-generating environmental rehabilitation, and livelihood diversification. This represents an area that would indirectly but significantly impact ASDM and the broader communities in which it is embedded.

3. B4, A4, A3, A2, A1 (Harmonization of legal frameworks; Financial transparency and good governance; Strengthen property rights; Enhance data collection and analysis; and Lower fees and increase accessibility of mining licenses). This grouping would focus on the overall governance framework and its application in the field. This represents an area that sets the space in which ASDM operates, and hence would have a large impact.

Given the ongoing activities of the government and the future activities of other development partners, coordination and determining an appropriate niche is essential. The above schema offers one tool to determine which type of intervention would offer the most value.

The attention currently being paid to ASDM in Côte d’Ivoire is positive, and the coalescence of partners offers a rare opportunity to make significant advances in harnessing the development potential of diamonds. The communities are ready, and conditions are ripe. It is now up to the different stakeholders to coordinate, determine the best way forward, and follow through.
Annex 1. List of People Met

**Focus groups**

Villagers from Bobi  
Villagers from Duala  
Villagers from Diarabana  
Villagers from Masala-Asolo  
Villagers from Niongonon  
Villagers from Siana  
Villagers from Mamourla  
Villagers from Ousougoula  
Villagers from Dona  
Villagers from Soukoura  
ASM permit holders union of Tortiya  
KP Secretariat

**Semi-structured interviews**

KP Permanent Secretary  
Mining Ministry Director of Mining Development  
Mining Ministry Sub-Director of Artisanal and Semi-Industrial Authorizations  
Mining Ministry Sub-Director of Technical Controls  
Mining Ministry Division Head, Worker Health and Safety  
DD Mines Séguéla  
DD Mines Tortiya  
Mining Ministry field agent Séguéla  
SODEMI field agents  
SODEMI adviser to the director-general  
Former Tortiya deputy  
Former SAREMCI research director  
Sous-préfet Séguéla  
Sous-préfet Tortiya  
DD Agriculture Séguéla  
Worodougou union of cooperatives (Séguéla)

**Interactions as part of group meetings**

20 civil society organizations during conference on Washington Declaration  
22 GVC presidents during meeting on updating cooperative legal documents
### Enquête Artisan Minier Séguéla

**Date de l’enquête:**

1. Identifiant de l'enquêté :

2. Coopérative : (1 = Bobi ; 2 = Diarabana ; 3 = Dualla ; 4 = Soukoura ; 5 = Sangana)

3. Age:

4. Nombre d’enfants :

5. Nombre total de toutes les personnes dans le ménage :

6. Nationalité : ☐ Ivoirienne ☐ Non-ivoirienne

### Information socio-économique général


- ☐ Diamants (1)
- ☐ Or (2)
- ☐ Agriculture vivrière (3) Spécifiez :
  - ☐ Anacarde (4)
- ☐ Elevage (5) Spécifiez :
- ☐ Petit commerce non-diamant (6) Spécifiez :
- ☐ Travail temporaire non-diamant (7)
- ☐ Salaire (8)
- ☐ Autre (9) :
8. De toutes les activités, laquelle a apporté le plus d’argent dans votre ménage?

Numéro de l’activité :

9. De toutes les activités, laquelle avez-vous consacré le plus de temps ? Et votre femme ?

Homme :  
Femme :

10. Entre Ramadan 2012 et Ramadan 2013, avez-vous vécu en dehors de votre village pour travailler ?

- Oui  
- Non

11. Si oui, combien de mois ?

- Moins de 3  
- Entre 3 et 6 mois  
- Plus de 6 mois

12. Sur le plan financier, comment a été votre année (entre Ramadan 2012 et Ramadan 2013) comparée aux années précédentes? (Lisez les réponses et cochez une seule.)

- Très bien  
- Un peu bien  
- Pas de changement  
- Un peu mauvais  
- Très mauvais  
- Je ne sais pas

13. Avez-vous les biens suivants?

- Antenne parabolique  
- Panneau solaire ou groupe électrogène  
- Moto  
- Chaises en plastique  
- TV ou lecteur DVD  
- Maison en tôle

Dans le meilleur mois de l’année passée (entre Ramadan 2012 et Ramadan 2013) sur le plan économique, vous avez pu gagner à peu près combien d’argent ?

- Plus d’un million CFA  
- Entre 50.000 CFA et 100.000 CFA  
- Entre 500.000 mille et 1 million CFA  
- Entre 25.000 CFA et 50.000 CFA  
- Entre 250.000 et 500.000 CFA  
- Entre 0 et 25.000 CFA  
- Entre 100.000 et 250.000 CFA  
- Rien  
- Je ne sais pas
14. Dans le pire mois de l’année passée (entre Ramadan 2012 et Ramadan 2013) sur le plan économique, vous avez pu gagner à peu près combien d’argent ?

- Plus d’un million CFA
- Entre 50.000 CFA et 100.000 CFA
- Entre 500.000 mille et 1 million CFA
- Entre 25.000 CFA et 50.000 CFA
- Entre 250.000 et 500.000 CFA
- Entre 0 et 250.000 CFA
- Entre 100.000 et 250.000 CFA
- Rien
- Je ne sais pas

**Information sur l’activité minière**

15. Depuis combien d’années êtes-vous impliqué dans le diamant ?

- Toute ma vie
- Plus de 20 ans
- Entre 10 et 20 ans
- Entre 5 et 10 ans
- Moins de 5 ans

16. Dans l’année passée (entre Ramadan 2012 et 2013), avez-vous exercé une activité de diamant ?

- Oui
- Non

17. Vous avez exercé cette activité pour combien de temps?

- Toute l’année
- Moins d’un mois
- Seulement pendant la saison sèche
- Je ne sais pas

18. Dans l’année passée (entre Ramadan 2012 et 2013), avez-vous trouvé des diamants ?

- Oui
- Non

19. Dans l’année passée (entre Ramadan 2012 et 2013) vous avez trouvé à peu près combien de pierres?

- Rien
- Entre 1 et 5
- Entre 6 et 10
- Plus de 50
- Entre 11 et 20
- Entre 21 et 50

20. Dans l’année passée (entre Ramadan 2012 et 2013), le diamant le plus gros pesait combien de carats ?

, carats
21. Dans l’année passée (entre Ramadan 2012 et 2013), le diamant le plus petit pesait combien de carats?
, carats

22. Dans l’année passée (entre Ramadan 2012 et Ramadan 2013) avez-vous été financé par quelqu’un ?

☐ Oui ☐ Non ☐ Je ne sais pas ☐ Question pas pertinente

23. Est-ce que cette personne vivait dans votre village ou venait ailleurs ?

☐ De mon village ☐ Ailleurs

24. En quoi consistait le financement? (Cochez toutes les réponses pertinentes.)

☐ Argent ☐ Cigarettes ☐ Outils ☐ Rations ☐ Autre :

25. Quelles personnes ont eu un pourcentage du prix de vente ?

☐ Mon financeur ☐ La SODEMI ☐ Le chef de village

☐ Les ouvriers dans votre équipe ☐ Votre tuteur ☐ Autre :

26. Dans l’année passée (Ramadan 2012 à 2013), avez-vous entendu parler ou vécu les conflits suivants ?

☐ Conflit de limites de site ☐ Conflit lié au vol de diamant

☐ Conflit avec agriculteur ou éleveur ☐ Autre conflit :

☐ Conflit sur le prix de vente

27. Dans l’année passée (Ramadan 2012 à 2013), avez-vous rebouché les trous exploités ?

☐ Oui ☐ Non ☐ Je ne sais pas
Informations sur les besoins

28. Imaginez qu’il y a un financement pour améliorer la vie des artisans miniers, leurs familles et leur village. Ce financement ne peut pas tout faire. Indiquez si les interventions suivantes sont très importante, un peu importante, ça change rien, ou mauvaise.

(1) **Améliorer des outils de travail**
- Très importante
- Un peu importante
- Ça change rien
- Mauvaise
- Je ne sais pas

(2) **Améliorer les techniques d'exploitation**
- Très importante
- Un peu importante
- Ça change rien
- Mauvaise
- Je ne sais pas

(3) **Introduire un centre de lavage mécanisé pour toutes les coopératives**
- Très importante
- Un peu importante
- Ça change rien
- Mauvaise
- Je ne sais pas

(4) **Améliorer les techniques de prospection**
- Très importante
- Un peu importante
- Ça change rien
- Mauvaise
- Je ne sais pas

(5) **Améliorer la connaissance de comment déterminer la valeur du diamant**
- Très importante
- Un peu importante
- Ça change rien
- Mauvaise
- Je ne sais pas

(6) **Aider à réhabiliter l'environnement en rebouchant les trous pour faire de l'agriculture**
- Très importante
- Un peu importante
- Ça change rien
- Mauvaise
- Je ne sais pas

(7) **Améliorer l'organisation et la gestion interne des coopératives**
- Très importante
- Un peu importante
- Ça change rien
- Mauvaise
- Je ne sais pas

(8) **Aider les coopératives à financer eux-mêmes des travaux avec des prêts**
- Très importante
- Un peu importante
- Ça change rien
- Mauvaise
- Je ne sais pas

(9) **Aider les artisans à développer d'autres sources de revenus à part le diamant**
- Très importante
- Un peu importante
- Ça change rien
- Mauvaise
- Je ne sais pas

(10) **Appuyer les femmes de la communauté pour améliorer leurs activités économiques**
- Très importante
- Un peu importante
- Ça change rien
- Mauvaise
- Je ne sais pas

29. Est-ce que vous avez d'autres idées ? __________________________________________________________

30. Parmi toutes les interventions, laquelle serait la meilleure pour améliorer la vie des mineurs?
- Numéro : (mettez 0 pour Je ne sais pas)

31. Parmi toutes les interventions, laquelle serait la moins importante pour améliorer la vie des mineurs?
- Numéro : (mettez 0 pour Je ne sais pas)
Notes